By Torsten Persson
A large empirical research of the "missing hyperlink" among constitutional platforms and monetary coverage and results.
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Extra resources for The Economic Effects of Constitutions
Sample text
Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997, 2000) formally demonstrate this venerable point. In the setting of both papers, incumbent politicians set policy under alternative assumptions about legislative bargaining designed to capture some basic distinctions between different forms of government. The incumbents are held accountable by retrospective voters. Because of the greater concentration of powers in parliamentary regimes, it is easier for politicians to collude with each other at the voters’ expense; in equilibrium, 8.
Voters prefer honest candidates but disagree on ideology. Dishonest incumbents may still cling to power if voters sharing the same ideological preferences cannot find an honest substitute candidate. With large districts, an honest candidate is available for all ideological positions, and in equilibrium, dishonest candidates have no chance 6. As discussed in the previous note, the papers under discussion can also be thought of as considering a reform from a strictly majoritarian with a strictly proportional electoral system, where both district magnitude and the electoral formula are changed at the same time.
4 Forms of Government Recent theory has devoted less effort to studying the rules for legislation than those for elections. But it has clarified the consequences of two aspects of the legislative regime inherent in different forms 7. Indeed, commenting on the career concern model discussed above, Persson and Tabellini (2000a) formulate this conjecture with regard to the effect of the ballot structure. Forms of Government 23 of government. These concern the powers over legislation: to make, amend, or veto policy proposals.